Unfiltered Insights: Addressing Your Questions on Middle East Conflicts

You wrote. A lot of you wrote. Since this brief changed shape a few weeks ago, my inbox has filled with questions, arguments, corrections, kind words, and a few letters I'll keep to myself. Today I answer as many as I can.

Two ground rules, because several of you asked about them directly. I don't print names, just initials, and only when you signed. And I don't print the nasty ones; disagreement gets a full hearing here, contempt gets the delete key. Almost none of your mail qualified for the second category, which tells me something good about who reads this.

A theme ran through the pile, so I'll start there: a lot of you think Iran won this war, and that Washington signed the surrender. I think you're half right, and the half you've got wrong is the important half. Let's get into it.

Gregg Roman · June 25, 2026

In the mailbag today:

THE MAILBAG · I

This was the loudest drum in the mailbag.

Here is where I'll give you the hard version, because you've earned it.

Iran lost the war. Militarily, it is not close. Its air defenses were dismantled, its open-water navy and air force gutted, its missile production cratered, and its command decapitated. Ali Khamenei is dead and his son Mojtaba sits in his place atop a weakened structure. New production data my colleague Dalga Khatinoglu assembled show the regime's largest petrochemical group running at 13% of last year's output, steel down two-thirds, GDP off nearly 5% (MEF / Khatinoglu). That is not a victor's balance sheet. The "Iran won" claim treats a regime that cannot feed or employ its own people as the master of the region. It isn't.

But here is your half that's right, and it's the half that matters. You are not really arguing about the war. You're arguing about the deal, and on the deal, your anger is well aimed. A government can lose every battle and still win the peace if the other side hands it back at the table. Of the deal's fourteen points (the memorandum's own structure), zero require Iran to give up a missile or disarm a single proxy; the draft carries no limits on Iran's ballistic missiles at all (Reuters / The Hindu). So when you say "America surrendered," I'd put it more precisely: America won the war and is negotiating like it lost. That is worse, in a way, because it was avoidable.

As for the readers who say we stopped too early (that a longer campaign might have toppled the regime): you and I are closer than you think. The Forum's standing conclusion is that the only permanent guarantee against an Iranian bomb is a different government in Tehran, and that the regime's greatest vulnerability is the Iranian people it has brutalized. Where I part company is the means. The next phase should be Israel-led with its regional allies and mostly non-kinetic: coalition-building and influence operations, backing the people, not another missile volley. The window for that didn't close when the shooting paused. It's open now, and the deal is the thing trying to slam it shut.

J.S., who edits an intelligence newsletter, reached for Tet, the 1968 offensive the U.S. won on the battlefield and lost in the living room, because it broke American will. It's the sharpest letter I got, and the analogy bites. My answer: the material destruction here is real in a way Hanoi's losses were obscured at the time, but the will half of your point is exactly right, and it's why I keep insisting this isn't over. Declaring victory and sailing home is precisely how a battlefield win becomes a strategic defeat. Tet is the warning. The deal is us walking into it with our eyes open.

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THE MAILBAG · II

R.B. also sent a genuinely useful technical analysis: that the futures-market drop in oil prices is running ahead of physical reality, because insurance and war-risk premiums, mine-clearing, and a gradual tanker ramp mean real barrels won't flow at pre-war volume for months. On that, you're right, and it's a point most coverage misses. Brent fell below $75 on anticipation; the physical strait is another matter. Qatar's prime minister concedes traffic won't normalize until roughly thirty days after the agreement, and insurers are only now exhaling (gCaptain). Where I get off the train is the conclusion that this proves Iran "won" and Israel is now a friendless pariah. The opposite signal is louder: the Abraham Accords bloc held through a regional war, Morocco deepened its Israeli partnership, and the Gulf states are hedging toward Tehran out of fear, not affection, which is a problem to manage, not a defeat to mourn.

Several of you, including the reader who called the agreement "a HUDNA" and predicted war resumes after the November midterms, have the framework exactly right. A hudna is a tactical truce, not a peace, and Tehran treats it as breathing room to rebuild. R.S. predicted that "when the deal falls apart, Trump will go ballistic, because he hates to be seen as a fool." I won't make political predictions about any president in this space, but I'll give you the structural read: there is a sixty-day clock, Iran has every incentive to run it out, technical talks resume around June 30 (The Express Tribune), and a deal that demands nothing of Iran's arsenal is a deal built to be re-traded the moment Tehran has a grievance. Plan for friction this winter. You are not wrong to.

THE MAILBAG · III

More than one of you asked some version of this, politely, and fairly. So, plainly: I'm Gregg Roman, executive director of the Middle East Forum, a Philadelphia-based research center that has worked on U.S. Middle East policy and the fight against Islamism since 1990. This newsletter is my daily attempt to tell you what I'm seeing without the institutional throat-clearing. You're most likely receiving it because you signed up at meforum.org, you've supported the Forum, or someone forwarded you an issue and you stuck around. If none of those ring a bell, the unsubscribe link at the bottom always works, no hard feelings. But I'm glad you're here.

J.M. asked the same and added a question I'll answer with a clear yes: am I available for interviews? I am: radio, podcast, television, panels. Reply to this email or write the Forum's media desk and we'll make it work.

To N.G. in Raleigh, S.W. in Delaware, Y., S.R., and W.T.: thank you for the kind notes. "Readable, interesting, sufficiently thoughtful and profound" (S.W.) is going on the wall. W.T., good luck with the R&D; tell me what you build.

And to R., who sent a long, searching letter about Rome and American decline, the environmental toll of the war, and how planners assumed the regime would collapse from within: I share more of your worry than you'd guess, especially on the point that Washington war-gamed a single scenario (internal collapse) and ignored that the IRGC was built to fight decentralized and dug-in. That failure of imagination is real. On some of the specific claims in your letter (a reported Emirati protection payment, leftover Russian nuclear material), I can't confirm them, so I won't repeat them as fact; if hard sourcing surfaces, I'll chase it. But the core of what you're feeling, that we keep kicking the can, is the same thing animating this whole newsletter.

THE MAILBAG · IV

How should Netanyahu handle Trump when their interests diverge? (B. asked, and several of you seconded it.) My answer is the Post-Aid Alliance: stop behaving like a client and start behaving like a sovereign ally. A client asks permission and absorbs pressure; an ally informs, coordinates, and keeps its own freedom of action. The good news is Bibi already knows it. This week he reminded an audience that before last year's strike on Iran he "did not ask for permission… I simply informed" Washington, and that Israel must "free itself from dependence" and build its own arms base (Times of Israel). That's the right posture. The wrong one would be a public feud. Don't make it personal; make it structural. Keep operational independence (the IDF's fire policy in Lebanon is not Washington's to trade), widen the Accords so the relationship isn't a two-body problem, and let results, not loyalty oaths, set the terms. An ally you respect, you consult. A client, you manage. Israel's job is to be impossible to manage.

Could the Kurds be a counterforce against the IRGC? (M.K.) It's a serious question and I'll give it a serious, cautious answer. The logic of the Iran Freedom Project says yes in principle: the regime's deepest vulnerability is its own captive nations, Kurds among them, and Iran's roughly ten million Kurds are real leverage. But your own letter contains the warning: the Kurds remember being armed, used, and abandoned, and they are right to want guarantees before they move. I won't cheer them toward a rising the United States has a track record of not backing. Add Erdoğan's Turkey to the north drifting toward Tehran, and the picture is exactly the vise you describe. So the Kurds are part of the answer, not the whole of it, and only as one front in a patient, allied, mostly non-kinetic campaign, not a tripwire we light and walk away from. As for whether Israel has "tricks up its sleeve": it does, and the wise ones stay up the sleeve.

What about the federations and the legacy organizations? This came from a reader who knew me in my Pittsburgh days, so I'll be honest the way you'd expect. The legacy institutions are built for consensus, and consensus is slow, cautious, and allergic to controversy, precisely the wrong instrument in a moment that rewards speed and clarity. Some have risen to it; many have issued the careful statement and called it leadership. I came out of that world and I have affection for it, but affection isn't an excuse. The donors who fund those institutions should ask harder questions about whether "convening" and "condemning" is the same thing as moving the needle. Often it isn't.

And the New York Times: how do we force it to practice journalism? (Asked by a reader who closed with "thanks for all the good work," so, thank you.) I'll be careful here, because the answer is not the one some want. You don't fix the Times by government pressure; the First Amendment protects bad journalism along with good, and we don't want the precedent. You fix it the slow way, which is also the only durable way: document the pattern rigorously rather than just complaining (groups like CAMERA and HonestReporting do exactly this); demand specific, on-the-record corrections instead of venting; make the bias visible (the Daylight Doctrine applied to media) so readers can price it in; support the competitors eating the legacy outlets' lunch; and vote with your subscription. An institution that large doesn't reform because it's shamed. It reforms when the audience and the authority drain away. That's happening. Help it along.

THE MAILBAG · V

"Tamkeen": I Googled it and got a website in Bahrain. What gives? (A sharp catch.) Two different things share the word. Tamkeen (تمكين) is Arabic for "empowerment" or "consolidation," and it's the term Islamist movements use for their long strategy of embedding inside a free society's institutions (charities, campuses, courts, professional bodies) until they can steer them. That's the sense I used it in. The Bahraini "Tamkeen" you found is a government labor fund that happens to use the same ordinary word. Same vocabulary, unrelated entity. Nothing's wrong with your search engine.

Is the new push for donations, or subscriptions? (From a loyal annual donor, thank you.) Fair question, and here's the clean answer: the newsletter itself is free. There's an optional premium tier ($12/month or $100/year) for the weekend Long View, the full archive, and quarterly threat briefings. And if you already give to the Forum, you get premium comped; just reply and we'll set it up. Your annual gift to the Middle East Forum is a separate thing, it funds the analysis behind all of this, and it's always welcome. I'm not trying to convert a donor into a subscriber. You're already doing the more important one.

Some of you dislike the digest format. One reader wrote that when a newsletter opens into a "bundle," they often skip it. I hear you, and I won't pretend everyone wants the same thing. The bundle exists because this region moves on ten fronts at once and a single-story email would miss most of the board. But the standalone pieces live at meforum.org if you'd rather read one argument at a time, and I'm always testing the shape. Tell me what you'd cut. I read these.

THE REGIONAL BRIEF · PAST 24 HOURS

The mail doesn't pause the war. Here's the board.

Lebanon, the loudest front. Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani told Israel to leave all of Lebanon "voluntarily" or be "forced to flee in defeat," Tehran dictating terms while Washington plays mediator (Times of Israel; The Hindu). Defense Minister Israel Katz and the prime minister flatly rejected any pullback, even as a U.S. State Department official claimed Israel had made a "good faith" partial withdrawal, a claim both Israel and Lebanon denied (The National). That same official floated the LAF backfill: the Lebanese Armed Forces should "move in and verifiably clear out" Hezbollah, a "model… repeated across South Lebanon," i.e., replace a functional army with one Hezbollah has infiltrated. On the ridge, the IDF killed Hezbollah operatives in two separate engagements near Ali al-Taher; Hezbollah called the dead, affiliated with its Islamic Health Society, "medics" and a "violation" (Jerusalem Post; BBC).

The West Bank underground. Israeli police uncovered a tunnel about 25 meters deep on Jerusalem's eastern edge, dug from the direction of the West Bank and, police said, "intended for terrorist activity," the subterranean war reaching the capital's doorstep (Haaretz). In the northern West Bank, IDF raids around Jenin and Salfit drew the predictable "extrajudicial killings" charge from the Palestinian Prisoner's Society (WAFA).

The negotiation theater. Netanyahu reaffirmed he "did not ask for permission" before striking Iran; he "simply informed" Washington, and said Israel must free itself from military dependence (Times of Israel). The IAEA insists inspections will resume; Tehran says "no protocol exists." Trump touts progress and warns talks end if Iran charges Hormuz tolls (Al-Monitor). Pakistan's foreign office says technical talks resume next Tuesday (~June 30), a "temporary gap" (Express Tribune).

The Gulf scramble. Oman's Badr Albusaidi backpedaled hard on transit fees, promising "toll-free safe passage," soothing Washington after Tehran floated the extortion scheme (Seoul Economic Daily). Iran's Ghalibaf offered the Gulf "security agreements… made sustainable through economic cooperation," the arsonist selling fire insurance (ISW). Qatar wants any Hormuz arrangement "discussed collectively" with Iran, Oman, and the Gulf, inserting itself while rejecting Iranian fees (TIPP Insights). Riyadh is reportedly preparing an Iran-Gulf reconciliation summit, hedging as American deterrence thins (Semafor). And Secretary Rubio, at the GCC meeting in Bahrain, reassured allies: "While we want a deal, we don't want a deal at any price" (Khaleej Times).

The edges. Turkey detained 200-plus people in Ankara before the July 7-8 NATO summit; officials cite ISIS and far-left cells, while rights groups say journalists, lawyers, and an LGBTQ-rights editor were swept up, with a 13-day protest ban (Deutsche Welle; The Hindu / AP). Iran's state media ran a synchronized line that U.S. partnerships "fuel instability" for the Gulf, information warfare aimed at prying allies loose (ISW). Gaza's Hamas-run health ministry put the war's toll past 73,000 as of mid-June, a figure the world accepts without verification to constrain Israeli operations (Washington Post). At home, Israeli State Attorney Amit Aisman warned of "repeated" political pressure on law enforcement and a campaign of "delegitimization" (Times of Israel).

FROM THE FORUM

THE ASK

Two things today. First, the book. The Closing Window is out July 1, six days away. It's the novel of exactly this deal: a memorandum negotiated in Islamabad, a sixty-day clock, and three Iranians caught inside the regime's "internal affairs" the agreement promises not to touch. Launch weeks are decided fast, by pre-orders and early reviews. If today's mail moved you, pre-order the ebook and forward this issue to one person who follows Iran.

Second, the work. The analysis in this issue (Khatinoglu counting the wreckage, D'Hippolito on the Guard, Ayoub on Morocco) exists because the Forum is funded by readers, not by the governments it tries to move. If you value it, and especially if you're not yet a supporter, this is the place.

Keep the mail coming. Tell me where you sit (policy, press, government, or just paying attention), and tell me where I'm wrong. I read every reply, and the best of them end up here.

Gregg

You're reading the free edition. Go Premium for the weekend Long View, the full archive, and quarterly threat briefings. Already a Forum donor? Reply and I'll comp it.

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